44 F3d 1150 united states v. j holmes _ openjurist meaning of anti money laundering


While [f]ew rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense, chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1049, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973), this right does not preclude a judge from placing reasonable restrictions on the admission of evidence based on the concerns as to prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. Delaware v. Van arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). Absent a clear abuse of discretion, a trial judge retains a wide latitude to exclude irrelevant, repetitive, or cumulative evidence. Id.; see also united states v. Edwards, 631 F.2d 1049, 1051 (2d cir.1980) (district court has broad discretion to exclude evidence that is irrelevant or cumulative); united states v.

Rahme, 813 F.2d 31, 37 (2d cir.1987) ([t]he permissible scope and extent of cross-examination lie within the discretion of the trial judge).Meaning of anti money laundering


We see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s excluding holmes’s additional witnesses. As to three of the witnesses, the government objected on relevancy grounds, arguing that their testimony would explain neither the depositing into holmes’s personal bank accounts of any checks that the government claimed were fraudulently issued nor the disposition of funds related to those checks. When the court inquired as to the relevance of the witnesses’ testimony, holmes’s counsel responded that it was offered to prove that the cash withdrawals that the government claimed constituted the structured withdrawals of the embezzled money could have been the withdrawal of the three witnesses’ money. However, when the court inquired whether the witnesses would testify to specific transactions within the relevant time frame or to the specific dates that they had received money from holmes, counsel responded that [t]hey could not testify [as to] a particular date.Meaning of anti money laundering absent some connection between the testimony and the transactions at issue in this case, there was no abuse of discretion in excluding the testimony.


During trial, the defense called agent mazzella, who testified that he had suggested to robidoux that she tape-record telephone conversations with holmes. On direct, mazzella confirmed that he knew the defendants were targets of a criminal investigation, that subpoenas had already been issued seeking documents from the union in connection with the investigation that led to this trial, that he was aware that there was a motion to quash the subpoena, and that he had seen the papers for the motion. When counsel asked if mazzella knew whether the defendants’ motion to quash was made pro se or through counsel, the district court sustained the government’s objection and asked, what does this line of questioning have to do with anything?Meaning of anti money laundering when holmes’s counsel started to answer, judge if they were represented by counsel at that time * * * , the court interrupted and prohibited counsel from continuing this line of questioning. Defendants now contend that further questioning would have revealed that mazzella intentionally violated their fifth and sixth amendment rights by seeking to obtain incriminating evidence from holmes when holmes was a target of a criminal investigation and was represented by counsel.


Even if we were to entertain holmes’s argument on its merits, however, we would reject it because, at the time, holmes’s conversations with robidoux were not protected by either the fifth amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination or the sixth amendment right to counsel. As to the fifth amendment, in illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 110 S.Ct. 2394, 110 L.Ed.2d 243 (1990), an undercover officer, disguised as a fellow cellmate, was not compelled to give miranda warnings to an imprisoned defendant prior to asking questions that could elicit incriminating statements.Meaning of anti money laundering the court reasoned that the suspect’s fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination was not violated, because when the accused made incriminating statements there was no danger of coercion or compulsion, nor was there a police-dominated atmosphere. Id. At 296, 110 S.Ct. At 2397 (internal quotes omitted). The court further explained that statements that are the result of [p]loys to mislead a suspect or lull him into a false sense of security are admissible into evidence as long as they do not rise to the level of compulsion or coercion. Id. At 297, 110 S.Ct. At 2397.